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Abstract

For electronic commerce and other applications it is required to encrypt data that is transmitted
over an unsecured channel. The data is encrypted/randomized using a key. Algorithms such as
DES and ECC randomize the data such that un-authorized user cannot decrypt it .This thesis
presents a practical implementation of a quasi group based multilevel, indexed scrambling
transformation for use in signal encryption. Results of experiments with text and speech
scrambling are presented. It is shown that the quasi group transformation maximizes the entropy
at the output, which is desirable for a good system. This system provides extremely large group
of keys that ensures enhanced security. It can work in either the chain mode or the block mode.
Block mode is more tolerant to errors compared to the chain mode.
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Chapter 1: Purpose and Technical Background

1.1 Introduction
Security is of fundamental importance in digital communication. . The system should be secure against
brute force attacks and impersonation by the eavesdropper. Encryption is the general name given to
coding the sensitive data such that only legitimate user/authority can understand it.
The idea of encryption has been around for about over 2000 years. Julius Caesar is credited with
developing a substitution cipher that is named after him now. The Kama sutra cipher [20] is yet another
substitution cipher that has been used in India for nearly two millennia.
With the advent of micro-technology, computers have become more powerful. Simple
substitution ciphers are no longer safe for encoding sensitive personal information. This need for a better
encoding system led to the development of symmetric and asymmetric key cryptosystem. In symmetric
cryptosystem one key is used to encrypt the data and the same key is used to decrypt it. This system can
be broken easily by brute force if the key is not sufficiently large.
Public Key Encryption, or asymmetric key encryption, is much more secure than symmetric key
encryption for the purposes of e-commerce. The main difference in Public Key Encryption was the
introduction of the second key - which makes it very difficult to crack by increasing the number of
possibilities. This scheme relies on two keys, one of which is public and the other is private. If you have
one key, the other key cannot be inferred from it. The public key is published and any user who wants to
connect to communicate with a business has to use the public key to encode his message. At the
destination the intended business decodes it using their private key
To avoid any foul play this system needs central trusted authority to distribute “Digital
Certificates” to valid users/business.
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One of the most famous encryption systems, RSA, is based on asymmetric key concept. In this
cryptosystem if Alice wants to communicate with Bob, she transmits her public key (n,e) to Bob and
keeps the private key secret. Bob then wishes to send message m to Alice.
He first turns M into a number m < n. He then computes the cipher text ‘C’ corresponding to:

This can be done quickly using the method of exponentiation by squaring. Bob then transmits
to Alice. Alice can recover ‘m’ from’ c’ by using her private key ‘d’ by the following computation:

Thus she can recover the original message ‘m’
It can be observed that the strength of the RSA cipher depends on the size of ‘n’ and if it can be
factorized the RSA cryptosystem is no longer secure. In 1994, Peter Shor published Shor's algorithm,
showing that a quantum computer could in principle do the factorization in polynomial time. However
Kak in [14], [15] and [16] proposed that the idea of quantum computing is not very feasible. Consider
the discrete possibility of quantum computers being possible in the near future, and then the RSA
cryptosystem would be obsolete. Thus one way of making a crypto-system secure is to increase the
number of keys and that what the proposed crypto-system does. As a matter of fact the Quasi group
crypto-system can generate more keys than ECC even when we consider small orders (order of the
Quasi group).
On the other hand one might say that the proposed (MIQE) Cryptosystem is similar to DES. It is
agreeable that just like DES and Triple DES this is some sort of scrambling technique. However if the
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key is kept secret for the time of transmission it would be nearly impossible to extract the encrypted
data. It is found that the number of isotopes increase with the increase in the order of n!(n-1)! where n is
the order of the quasi group.

1.2 Technical Background
Permutation transformations are a basic operation in many scrambling and encryption systems. Many
early ciphers for data and speech security [2], [3], [6], [8], [12],[13] were based on permutation
transformations, and message authentication systems also use such transformations. It was shown in an
earlier study by N.S. Jayant and one of the authors of the present paper [6] that a simple permutation of
samples does very well in destroying intelligibility of speech, but for further protection against brute
force attack it is essential to increase the number of possible keys. Quasi groups (or Latin squares)
provide a powerful method for generating a larger set of permutation transformations by permuting not
only the samples but also transforming the amplitudes themselves across their range [11]. By doing this,
they provide an immensely large number of keys, even for small alphabets. Therefore, quasi group
based ciphers can have a variety of applications, and in some cases can be competitive to number theory
based systems in terms of the difficulty they offer to brute force attacks.
This thesis presents an implementation of quasi group-based permutations that has very good
encryption properties and, therefore, it has potential uses in symmetric cryptography as in design of
message authentication and hash functions as well as in speech scrambling. If the purpose of the
scrambler is to maximize the entropy at the output, then we see that the quasi group based system
accomplishes this successfully, even for input data that is constant. The immense complexity associated
with the task of finding the scrambling transformation ensures the effectiveness of the encryption
process.
Quasi group based scrambling has been proposed before, but the earlier techniques such as those
of Markovski and collaborators [4],[5],[9],[10] are insecure because their security is predicated only on
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the initial multiplier element that is like the seed of a random number generator. Here we propose a new
multilevel indexed implementation that allows several layers of permutations to be carried out in a
manner that is not only flexible but which enhances security. It distributes raw data stream based upon
the indices and the order of the quasi group under consideration. This unique key which consists of the
index numbers and the matrix orders r and s (associated with the permutations that are performed) is
kept secret and is transmitted by the trusted authority in a way that the keys do not repeat till a prespecified network time expires.
The output of the proposed encryptor is dependent upon the index numbers and the orders of the
matrix transformations that are sent by the trusted authority. The encryption is also dependent on six
multiplier elements that are generated by a secret algorithm based on the index numbers, the order of the
matrices under consideration and nonce (random number generated by trusted authority). This key s
updated by the network on a regular basis (once in every time interval that is far less that T, the time
needed to use brute force to decrypt the key sent by the trusted authority). Figure 1 illustrates the quasi
group encryptor .The module here takes the raw data stream and randomizes it based on the encryption
key (the encryption key). We show later that the output data has desirable autocorrelation properties.
We have applied this multilevel scrambling approach to text and speech problems with good effect.

This thesis is organized as follows:
In chapter 2 we introduce the reader to basics of Latin squares and quasi groups. Chapter 3
introduces quasi group signal processing in MIQE. Chapter 4 describes the operation of the multilevel
indexed quasi group encryption (MIQE) system. Chapter 6 deals with MEG1 and FG1 and Chapter 7
discusses the randomization properties of the cryptosystem .Chapter 8 presents a quasi group voice
scrambling system. Chapter 9 deals with the security aspects and explains the relative strength of the
system. The conclusion is in Chapter 10.

4

Figure1: Quasi group encryptor
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Chapter 2: Latin Squares and Quasi Groups

2.1 Latin Squares and Isotopes
A Latin square of order ‘n’ is an ‘n’ by ‘n’ array in which each of the ‘n2’ cells contains a symbol from
an alphabet of size n, such that each symbol in the alphabet occurs just once in each row and once in
each column. We build a matrix such that the row or column consists of elements from 1 through ‘n’.If
we permute in any way the rows, or the columns, or the symbols, of a Latin square, the result is still a
Latin square. We say that two Latin squares L and L0 are isotopic if L0 can be obtained from L by
performing certain row or column permutations or substitution or all three on it. Based upon the order
we can have several isotopes of the same fundamental quasi group. The number of isotopes can be give
be n!(n-1)! Which is tremendously large for large values of n, for example for n=5 we have a total of
161280 Latin squares.
In the proposed implementation we generate the fundamental Latin square based on the priori
criteria and then generate the isotopes based on the same. Since there can be many isotopes for any
given Latin square, we need to set a limit on the number of isotopes that are to be generated. Since it the
number of isotopes generated is a compromise between the security and the space available; it is up to
the network provider and the user to come to a common agreement. It is imperative that the length of the
index vector is less than the number of isotopes generated.

2.2 Quasi Group Definitions and Theory
A quasi group Q may be defined [1] as a group of elements (1,2,3,… n) along with a multiplication
operator such that for its elements x and y there exists a unique solution z, also belonging to Q, such that
the following two conditions are obeyed:

1. x*a=z

(1)
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2. y*b=z

A quasi group may be defined alternatively as a binary system (Q,*) satisfying the two conditions:
1. For any a, b belonging to Q there exists a unique x belonging to Q such that a*x=b
2. For any a, b belonging to Q there exists a unique y belonging to Q such that y*a=b

(2)

The multiplication table of a finite quasi group is a Latin square. In effect it means that a if we
make a square matrix with n symbols such that a symbol does not repeat itself in either the row or the
column then we get a Latin square. Now if we index the Latin square we get a Quasi group. If we
consider the row index as ‘q’ and the column index as ‘p’ then the product of ‘p’ and ‘q’ would give ‘a’
(an entry in the table correspond to row index ‘q’ and column index ‘p’). Thus ‘a’ denotes the product of
‘q’ and ‘p’. This is not to be confused with the general group theory. We however call it a group because
the product of any two symbols within the quasi group results in an element that lies with the symbol set
that constitutes the group.

Example 1: An example of a quasi group Q of order 5 with elements (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) is given by the
element multiplications of Table 1.
A multiplication operator in a quasi group behaves as a mapping between the row and the column
indices.
For example if x = 2 and a = 3, the resulting ‘z’ can be determined by looking up the element having the
row index of 2 and the column index of 3 in Table 1. We get the value of z as 5.
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Table 1: Multiplication table for a quasi group, n = 5
*

1

2

3

4

5

1

3

4

2

5

1

2

4

1

5

2

3

3

2

3

1

4

5

4

1

5

4

3

2

5

5

2

3

1

4
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Chapter 3: MIQE Encryption and Decryption

3.1 Quasi Group Signal Processing in MIQE
This section introduces the notation in the description of our multilevel indexed quasi group encryption
(MIQE) system.

Input data:

d1, d2, d3,… dn

Output data:

e1, e2, e3, … en

Transformation matrices:

R, S

Multiplier elements: q1, q2, q3,… qn
Indices:

I1, I2, I3,… In

The encryptor is represented by QE (stands for Quasi-Encryptor) and the

decryptor is

represented as QD (stands for Quasi-Decryptor) . The transformation matrices R,S are the fundamental
matrices for which the receiver generates the isotopes based upon an agreed criterion. Even the number
of isotopes generated is dependent on these criteria. The multiplier elements are generated by the MEG1
module inside the receiver. Each entry in the hidden key vector is used as a multiplier element with the
corresponding isotope index in the index vector. The output data is obtained after several levels of
encryption (we have implemented six layer encryption). However the number of isotopes used for
encryption depends on the level of security needed.

3.2 Encryption
Since the quasi group encryptor performs an operation on the input data and produces a randomized
output sequence it can be considered as some sort of a function that operates on data. In this thesis we
have only discussed about encryption of a data sequence. However one can also use this cipher for block
9

encryption. The block encryption scheme has the advantage of low error rate while the stream cipher
implementation has the advantage of being simple to implement.
The mathematical equation used for encryption is given by:

Ea(a1,a2,a3,…,an) = b1,b2,b3,…bn

(3)

Where E stands for the encryption function and output sequence is defined by:

b1=a*a1
bi=bi-1*ai

Where i increments from 2 to the number of elements that have to be encrypted, and a is the
leader or the hidden key. Equation (3) describes a typical single level quasi group encryptor.
We now illustrate the working of equation (3) with the help of the illustration of Figure 2, for which the
value of a=2. This equation maps the initial input data vector (a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6) = (2,4,1,2,3,3) into the
vector (b1,b2,b3,b4,b5,b6) for the case of the quasi group of Example 1 with the multiplication relationship
of Table 1.
The following steps are used during the process of encryption:

b1=a*a1=2*2=1
b2=b1*a2=1*4=1
b3=b2*a3=4*1=4
b4=b3*a4=4*2=5
b5=b4*a5=5*3=1
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b6=b5*a6=1*3=2

The sequence thus obtained (1,1,4,5,1,2) is then given as an input to another level of the
encryptor. This process is repeated several times. This multiple levels of mapping ensure that the
resemblance of the output data to that of the input data is minimized, making it harder for the
eavesdropper to decrypt the data until he has sufficient information regarding the number of times the
mapping was done by the sender.
In a variation to this approach, the multiplier element is varied, and generated by a special
algorithm called MEG1 that generates the multiplier elements based on the index numbers, nonce, and r
and s. This variant implementation may be given by the following equations:

Eh1,h2,h2…hn (a1,a2,a3,a4…an)=e1,e2,e3,...en

(4)

where

e1=a*a1 and ei=ei-1*ai

In the above equation the incoming stream of data is first mapped using the first multiplier
element h1 then the resultant steam is mapped considering the second multiplier element h2 , and this
process continues till all the multiplier elements are exhausted.
Consider Equation 5, the vector (h1,h2,h3,… hn) consists of all the multiplier elements .In this
approach this encryption key is transmitted along with the quasi group (this key is itself encapsulated by
another
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layer of encryption). It is understood that in the above two approaches another reliable encryption
algorithm is required to preserve the secrecy of the encryption

b1=h1*a1; b2=b1*a2;… bn=bn-1*an
(5)
c1=h2*b1; c2=c1*b2;... cn=cn-1*bn
.
.
e1=hn*s1; e2 =e1*s2;…en=en-1*sn

Moreover, one must transmit information regarding the quasi groups being used for encryption,
and this constitutes one of the main drawbacks of the above approach.
The third approach is the index based approach where the given data is encrypted through
several levels by the encryption. Let us consider that this changed order encryptor is given an input of all
1s (as illustrated in Figure 3). We see that after the second level encryption the input vector is mapped to
the sequence that has symbols ranging from 1 to the order of the second matrix. Therefore, if we have an
index key which references the matrices stored in the memory of the reception device, the eavesdropper
would not know which matrix is stored at a given index. To further improve the efficiency of this
encryptor we can include another function that arranges the quasi groups based upon a nonce that makes
the output more independent of the input. At any given time the output of the encryptor is different even
if the same set of indices is supplied to the algorithm.
Thus encryption in MIQE is represented by

QE hI1r,,hI2s ,... hn ( a1 , a 2 , a 3 ...a n ) = e1 , e2 , e3 ,...en
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(6)

where (a1,a2,a3,…an) is the input vector and (e1,e2,e3,…en) is the output vector, Ir and Is are indices
corresponding to the order of the quasi groups. The vector (h1,h2,h3…hn) is called the hidden key or the
secret key. It is the output of the MEG-1 algorithm.
In hidden key vector the first half entries are generally used as multiplier elements with the first
half index numbers in the Index vector (index in short refers to the isotope of the correspond quasi group
‘r’ or ‘s’) and the second half are used as multiplier elements with the second index numbers in the
Index vector.
In this approach even if the illegitimate user has access to the index numbers he need to know the
inbuilt protocol MEG1 in order to decipher the encoded data. This scheme is scalable because the
network administrator is given the option of setting the security level by assigning the number of
isotopes and the size of the quasi groups used for encryption. Even if the eavesdropper has the idea of
the index numbers and group orders; he still has to generate the isotopes based on a priori criteria. It
would be very difficult to break this cipher using brute force even with the knowledge of the indices and
group orders because these refer to the isotopes that are present in the database of a legitimate user.
From figure 3 it can be observed that after we obtain b1,b2,… b10 from the first quasi group operation
we perform a second encryption with the help of a quasi group whose order is greater than the first. By
doing this we further mask the original data. It must be noted that the actual implementation consists of
three encryption in layer one (with 3 isotopes of the first quasi group) followed by three encryptions in
layer two (with 3 isotopes of the second quasi group). Every entry in the hidden key
Vector corresponds to the multiplier element of the corresponding isotope as referenced by the
index vector.
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Figure 2: Quasi group mapping using an order 5 quasi group
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Figure 3: Encryption using 2 different groups of different order
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3.3 Decryption
This process is similar to encryption. First, the generation of the inverse matrix will be described. For
this one needs to understand the left inverse ‘\’ I used for the quasi group decryption (Figure 4 illustrates
the encryption and decryption of data).
The basic equation for encryption is as below:

D(a1,a2,a3,…an)= e1,e2,e3,…en

(7)

Where

e1=a\a1 and ei=ai-1\ai

To perform the process of decryption we need to first generate the inverse matrix of a given
quasi group and execute mapping procedure as described in the previous section (Figure 2). This must
be done using (7) rather than (6).
The decryptor for a multilevel indexed based algorithm cam be defined as follows:

QDhInr ,,hI ns −1 ,..h1 (e1 , e2 , e3 ,...en ) = a1 , a2 , a3 ,...an

(8)

The method of the MIQE decryptor is similar to the MIQE encryptor as shown in the next section.
1. The elements of the quasi group (marked as 1 in Figure 4) are labeled as w, the indices along the
horizontal are labeled v and the indices along the vertical are labeled u.
2. The elements of the inverse (left-inverse) of quasi group (labeled as 2 in Figure 4) are labeled as
v, the indices along the horizontal are labeled w and the indices along the vertical are labeled u-1.
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Figure 4: Determination of left division and the compete process of encryption and decryption

3.4 How to Determine the Left Inverse of a Quasi Group
By executing the following algorithm, one can generate the left inverse of a given quasi group:
1. Scan the row of the quasi group
2.

Locate an element i (start the value of i from 1) and note the value of v in the corresponding
location of the inverse matrix.
17

3. Increment i.
4. Go to step 1.
5. This process continues till all the elements in the row are exhausted.
6. Then go to the next row and repeat steps 1 through 3.
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Chapter 4: MIQE Design

4.1 MIQE Encryptor

Figure 5: The MIQE Encryptor

MIQE is a randomized algorithm that works on the encrypted key sent by a trusted authority. As
illustrated in the above figure (Figure 5), the input to this algorithm is a packet of data that consists of
the following fields:
1. The first field consists of the orders of the two quasi groups that have to be generated,
2. The second field consists of the index numbers I1,.. Ir and I1…..Is ,
3. The third field consists of the nonce.
19

The algorithm first generates a quasi group of order r with all the required properties, followed by the
generation of all the possible isotopes of that particular base quasi group. These isotopes are stored in
the data base in a specified manner. Later it generates another quasi group of order s and stores the
isotopes in a similar fashion.
These quasi groups can be accessed by the encryptor module based upon the index numbers
supplied to it. The encryptor module (described in detail in the later sections) codes the incoming data
based upon the indices supplied to it; this module is also dependent on the inputs from another module
that generates the multiplier seeds q1…qn. The multiplier elements are generated by a special algorithm
called MEG 1. It is obvious that all the devices that have to operate in the network have to have this
module embedded into their devices. Experimental results show that this algorithm has the capability of
scrambling data over a wide range depending upon the index numbers, r, s and the multiplier elements.

4.2 Parameters
In MIQE the final output data is dependent on the following factors:

1. Index numbers
2. Order of the index numbers
3. Order of the matrices r and s
4. The multiplier elements (q1,q2,q3,...qn)

4.2.1 Index Numbers and Their Order
Perhaps the most important parameters underlying the effectiveness of MIQE, the index numbers may
vary depending on the nonce and the order of the matrices. The nonce has two important functions:
1. It is used by the receiver to reset the database after the nonce expires
2. It is used by the Trusted Authority to generate an index and the order of the matrices. This way
even the trusted authority does not know the next key that is to be transmitted at any given point of
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time. The algorithm that generates the index numbers and the orders of the matrices is named as
FG-1 (the frame generator.)

Example 2: Let us assume that the FG1 algorithm generates the values of r, s and the index numbers as
shown in the example below. Let us assume the following values:

r=150 and s=270
I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, I6 :1, 2, 3, 5, 4, 6
Hidden key: 2, 3, 5, 6, 1, 4

Let d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7, d8, d9, d10 = 1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2. Given this amount of structure, this example
should show the true scrambling capability of the encryptor.
The output data is represented by the vector: e1, e2, e3,…e10
It must be noted that in the example we encode the data using six different matrices and the final
output data would have any number in between 1 and 270 (which the order of the second matrix ). One
might argue that the largest number in the encrypted sequence might be considered as the order of the
second matrix, but this is not possible because the encrypted data is produced by mapping the input data
through several levels and the probability of the occurrence of the largest number becomes a function of
the index vector which is random.
Moreover, experiments have revealed that sufficient security can be provided with group order
‘n’ as low as 10.
From Table 2 the following deductions may be made:
1. The output sequence does tend to be similar for some sequences of the index numbers, however it
does not exhibit any periodicity and is rather unpredictable when we consider the practical case
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where the output at any instance is dependent on other constraints such as the order of the matrix
involved and the hidden key.

Table 2: The decryption process
Serial Num.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Index Numbers
1,2,3,5,4,6
1,6,5,4,2,3
1,4,2,5,6,3
1,5,6,4,2,3
1,4,5,2,6,3
1,4,6,2,5,3
2,3,5,6,1,4
5,6,2,3,1,4
2,5,3,1,6,4
2,3,5,1,6,4
2,3,5,4,6,1
1,1,1,1,1,1
2,2,2,2,2,2
3,3,3,3,3,3
4,4,4,4,4,4

Output Sequence (e1,e2,e3,…e10)
126,95,162,16,123,93,163,216,176,249 **
125,92,154,267,83,17,30,268,107,14
126,95,162,16,123,93,163,216,176,249 **
126,95,162,16,123,93,163,216,176,249 **
127,99,172,36,158,149,247,66,71,199
121,82,137,244,58,268,30,36,209,214
270,255,190,9,140,21,91,27,67,169
123,84,136,240,62,45,48,22,113,252
1,255,189,7,137,17,86,21,60,161
##
1,255,189,7,137,17,86,21,60,161
##
4,261,200,24,161,49,127,72,122,235
124,87,139,232,13,161,90,208,152,109
2,255,193,18,159,55,146,110,186,63
5,259,180,220,231,134,164,31,237,149
269,240,131,104,126,62,65,3,113,2

2. One might argue that the eavesdropper can crack this code by simply doing a known plaintext
attack. But that is impossible because the algorithm that generates the keys has a random input
(owing to the nonce), and this nonce assures that even the Trusted Authority does not know the
key that it would be generating in the next instant. Moreover the nonce changes.

4.2.2 Order of Matrices r and s
In general there is no specified restriction on the order of the matrices supplied. However it is mandatory
that the order of r be smaller than that of s .One must also note that the final output sequence also
depends on the relative difference in the orders of the two matrices. It can be observed that the range of
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permissible sequence only depends upon the relative difference in between the order of the first and the
order of the second matrix.

4.2.3 The Multiplier Elements
The multiplier elements act like a seed to trigger the encryption process. In order to ensure the reliability
of the decrypted data, the whole network must have this key (hidden key). This problem is resolved by
embedding a special algorithm called MEG1 into all the valid network devices including the Trusted
Authority and the user handsets.
The multiplier elements depend upon the order of the matrix under consideration, the index
number, and the nonce. This algorithm ensures the following:

1. It is virtually impossible to break this cipher based on known plaintext attack
2. It reduces the effort to encrypt and decrypt the data for a legitimate user while the computational
requirement required to break this cipher is made tremendously high for an illegitimate user.
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Chapter 5: MEG1 and FG1 Algorithm

5.1 The FG 1 and MEG 1 Algorithms
The FG-1 and MEG-1 algorithm ensure the cryptographic strength of the MIQE. The Frame Generator
or FG-1 is responsible for the generation of the frame that contains the matrix orders, index numbers and
nonce to avoid duplication. The MEG1 or Multiplier element generator is responsible for the generation
of the multiplier elements that constitute the hidden key

5.2 The FG 1 Algorithm
From our study of the MIQE, it is evident that the security of the entire system depends on the
unpredictability of the key (r, s, index elements and nonce).The FG 1 module ensures that even the
Trusted authority doesn’t know the key that it would be transmitting in the next instant (next time slot).
This algorithm generates the order of the matrices (r,s), index numbers and the nonce, based on a
random input from a pseudo-random number generator. This module is essential due to the following
reason:
1) This module ensures that the next sequence of indices generated by the system is unpredictable.
2) The nonce is itself dependent on the random input which makes the system more dynamic.
3) The security of the system is dependent on the period of the random number generator and the
network time (network time is denoted by T. This time judges the value of nonce t that is to be sent
in the next frame and at any given instant the value of t should not exceed the value of T).
4) The security also depends on the other factors like length of the random symbol, number of indices
and the order of the quasi groups.

24

Figure 6: The MEG 1 and FG 1 algorithms

5.3 The MEG1 Algorithm
While the FG 1 algorithm is only required at the trusted authority the MEG 1 algorithm plays a major
role in the encryption and the decryption process. During the process of encryption It generates the
hidden key (explained before) and during the process of decryption the same key has to be generated at
the receiver in order to ensure proper decryption. The MEG 1 algorithm takes the entire incoming frame
and generates the multiplier elements.

5.3.1 Nonce t
The nonce acts like a random input to this algorithm. Since the hidden key generated is dependent on the
value of the nonce supplied to it, this algorithm would generate different hidden keys even if the same
orders (r,s) and index numbers are supplied to it . The nonce might be given by the formula

Nonce t = f (prsg)

(12)
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Where the “prsg” stands for the “Pseudo Random Number Generator”. We can even use the same
random number that is given as the input to the FG-1 module. Since the nonce is generated by FG-1, it is
evident that it remains constant for the entire network till it expires and a new transmission is made.
There is a tradeoff of security and overhead involved here. It is required that this nonce changes
as frequently as possible, but that increases the computational costs of the entire network. In order to
avoid any unnecessary overhead the nonce must be above a certain specified value. Assume that this
arbitrary limit is given by T1:

T1 < Nonce ‘t’ < T

(13)

The above equation can be very significant in determining the network overload. If T1 is very
small then the devices in the network would have to recalculate the groups and indices several times per
session and on the other hand if T1 is made too large (T1ÆT) then there is a high chance of the network
being compromised.

5.3.2 Orders r, s
Since in quasi group encryption the multiplier element for a certain level must belong to the quasi group
under consideration, the set of multipliers (q1,q2,q3…qn) belongs to the set of quasi group
(corresponding indices) that are being used at that particular instant for the process of encryption.
Let us suppose that I1, I2, I3 are the indices corresponding to the quasi group of order r and let I4,
I5, I6 be the indices corresponding to the quasi group of order s. Let us suppose that the MEG-1
generates q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6. This means that q1, q2, q3 are used as the multiplier elements during the
encryption using the quasi group of order r. In other words, for the data to be properly mapped q1, q2, q3
must belong to the group of order r. Likewise, the multipliers q4, q5, q6 must belong to the second group.
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Chapter 6: Randomness of the Encrypted Data

6.1 Randomness Introduction
A process or a system is called random if its output follows no specific describable pattern. In general
randomness is an objective property, a sequence that seems random to one observer may not appear
random to another observer. Mathematically one can generate random sequences that might seem
random if the observer has no idea of the algorithm being used, as a matter of fact most of the modern
day random number generators are based some mathematical formula.
However the process of using these pseudorandom indices to reference secret matrices generates
a totally random signal that bears no resemblance to the original data. Later in this chapter it will be
demonstrated that the output is random even if the input is totally predictable (look at example 3). If
encrypted data seems random then it becomes very difficult for the eves-dropper to decode the sequence
and get intelligible information out of it. Moreover he might think that it is just some channel noise. In
chapter 7 we have discussed the application of MIQE to voice scrambling. The output of QVS (Quasi
voice scrambler)

6.2 Randomization of Data Using MIQE
In this section we will study the characteristics of the output data by supplying some test data to MIQE.
In general the text information sent can be very random, repetitive or have certain characteristics (for
example, in English text the probability of occurrence of e is maximum) that would make a encoded file
vulnerable to the known plain text attack. Let us first consider the case of normal English text.
Let us consider the text document of Table 6 is supplied to the MIQE, the characters are then
permuted based on the key provided. The scrambling transform used is time dependent and this time
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dependency makes it cryptographically strong. The corresponding output data is also shown in the same
table. The key used was (35, 41, 5, 4, 2, 1, 6, 3).

Example 3: Input text together with the transformed sequence
•

Input data:

ONE DAY A COUNTRYMAN GOING TO THE NEST OF HIS GOOSE FOUND THERE AN EGG
ALL YELLOW AND GLITTERING WHEN HE TOOK IT UP IT WAS AS HEAVY AS LEAD AND
HE WAS GOING TO THROW IT AWAY BECAUSE HE THOUGHT A TRICK HAD BEEN
PLAYED UPON HIM BUT HE TOOK IT HOME ON SECOND THOUGHTS AND SOON FOUND
TO
•

Encoded data:

23 32 17 38 35 8 12 21 24 39 1 26 6 39 15 1 3 6 39 34 4 11 40 29 4 19 20 2 9 34 20 5
6 29 37 6 5 41 23 17 29 37 16 30 28 33 13 41 30 18 11 40 40 19 40 13 23 21 30 34 27
40 8 37 8 14 5 15 23 20 30 32 35 24 26 34 21 39 41 14 4 5 16 26
12 33 16 18 36 2 26 12 29 22 36 27 16 18 25 17 19 8 8 33 6 28

37 33 11 3 37 34 8
26 17 39 19 33 22 38

34 32 27 12 4 19 5 29 16 33 33 39 34 37 38 36 24 25 5 14 39 3 38 13 20 30 30 26 37
31 17 8 3 19 8 33 17 34 19 27 25 6 19 30 19 19 7 10 1 30

20 3 29 6 40 33 19 13 36

39 35 25 30 22 34 16 18 13 31 19 28 4 28 9 39 14 24 4 6 22 10 39 32 21 15 37 19 19
4 29 13 26 4 16 6 29 18 29 7 21 19 19 16 38 19 9 37 6 16 14 25 22 26 14 19 34 11 13
3 13 27 27 17 9 17 34 30 3 9 15 34 15 3 11 22
35 40 39 30 24 10 12 17 3 28 41 26 5 32 19 19
Key used: 35, 41,5,4,2,1,6,3
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18 39 26 19 41 32 29 10 20 11 11 13

Figure 7: Autocorrelation of the input data and the encoded data for Case 1
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Example 4
Let us suppose that the data supplied to the MIQE is highly redundant and it consists of a string of Es.
This example would illustrate its scrambling capabilities. In spite of this the output is mapped to a range
of values from 1 to 41. It must be noted that the first 2 integers in the key are the order of the matrices
and the remaining are the encryption indices.
• Input data:
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
EEE
• Encoded data:
11 10 24 28 33 11 23 8 28 10 17 20 2 40 29 15 22 2 30 6 30 7 29 37 22 10 7 9 18
29 38 12 30 17 33 7 10 27 28 38 38 33 12 11 19 4 12 29 6 7 12 9 37 16 12 34 26
40 17 39 36 41 38 36 16 31 34 8 32 35 9 33 1 34 29 20 1 33 7 33 34 33 13 9

4

18 5

5 38 3

39 38 6 32 18 34 16 21 34 9 41 24 12 34 30 35 19 7 32 7 32 1 24 21 20 5 27 11 23 7
12 27 35 12 9 18 2 33 41 9 33 32 23 35 5 29 15 16 23 5 21 40 3 6 16
30 1 27 15 19 17 22 18 35 23 38 27 36 18 35 24 17 27 6 9 23 37 32
26 2 6 6 33 32 8 21 3 12 1 32 29 22 6 26 21 4 33 7 38 33 16

4 27 18 23 12

36 23 41 6 5 28 20

23 5 8 12 21 19 40 6

24 1 28 9 4 5 7 37 2 35 8 23 4 16 7 3 12 22 18 36 27 31 37 19 34 35 7 17 8 36 9 34
21 30 28 7 27 40 35 25 16 19 10 15 20 6 8 18 1 22 8
10 35 41 34 35 11 17 23 11 36 35 22 25 34 38 14
Key used: 35, 41, 5, 4, 2, 1, 6, 3
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34 22 25 36 19 32 40 29 9 35 34

25 39 12 34 27 26 35 26 20 27 1

Figure 8. Autocorrelation of the raw data and the encoded data for a constant input sequence

We see from the autocorrelation graphs that the encrypted sequence is essentially two-valued and,
therefore, the output sequence is very random.
In the above three examples it can it can be observed that the output is random even when the input is
highly predictable. This is because the quasi group encryption is highly time dependent. This time
dependency has its own advantages and disadvantages. Since it is time dependent the described
cryptosystem can be implemented in parallel structure which would further enhance the productivity of
the system. This would however make the system more susceptible to errors that might occur during
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normal transmission. These errors can be reduced by operating the MIQE In block mode. In this mode
chunks of data is gathered (say each chunk containing about a 1000 symbols) and is passed through the
encryptor. Now, if the received data is corrupted then the effect of error is localized to that particular
block.
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Chapter 7: QVS – Quasi Group Voice Scrambler
7.1 Background
There are a several ways to implement a speech encryption. Some suggest that speech can be encrypted
using masking techniques. However these masking techniques cause increase in the bandwidth which is
not desirable, since in it increases the network overhead. On the other hand some authors have suggested
that scrambling might be a better approach, since a scrambled speech does not require any extra
transmission bandwidth. The QVS falls in to the second category.
Let us revisit the scrambling techniques. The following diagram depicts the two possible ways of
speech scrambling (Figure 9)

Figure 9: two types of scrambling
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In the first method the speech source is sampled and a linear transform is applied to it. The
transformed speech is then scrambled. At the destination the received speech is descrambled and inverse
transform is applied on it to retrieve the data. In order to decipher the signal the illegitimate user has to
first find out the method used for scrambling the data. If he somehow manages to discover the
underlying scrambling transform he might still find it difficult to find the linear transform. However if
either the linear transform or the scrambling transform is kept a secret [18] then it would be more
difficult to crack the system. Thus if one takes sufficient time to analyze network traffic it wouldn’t be
difficult to break this cipher. This system is highly susceptible to known plaintext attack (since the
transform is static). To make this system cryptographically strong one has to either keep changing the
linear transform or send different keys to the scrambler; so that it increases the number of possibilities

Figure 10: block diagrams of the two scrambling techniques
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In the second approach the speech is decomposed into its primitives. Symbols are assigned to
each primitive and these symbols are scrambled. Though this system sounds simple, it needs advanced
speech recognition module that is capable or recognizing speech primitives and assign unique symbols
to each primitive. Unfortunately due to the large number of possibilities it is very difficult to separate
primitives. More over speech synthesis generally produces somewhat mechanically sounding speech. So
we need complex signal processing algorithms to make this system usable. Due to the complexity
involved the second method is generally not used. The QVS system first samples data and performs
compression on it. In this stage the voice signal is generally decimated such that no significant
information is lost. The compressed signal under goes some preprocessing to make it more presentable
to the built in MIQE algorithm. The MIQE algorithm then transforms the give signal in to a highly
random signal that resembles noise in its characteristics. Let us now go through the QVS protocol in
detail

7.2 QVS – Quasi Group Voice Scrambler
This section describes an application of MIQE to speech scrambling [19]. Since the sampled speech is
not of integer type, some sort of pre-processing must be done because MIQE only scrambles integer data
(or binary). The quasi group voice scrambler (QVS) constitutes of an encoder and a decoder (Figure 11
is the encoder-decoder pair).
The encoder as indicated in the illustration has a pre-processor and MIQE while the decoder has MIQE
and post-processor. It should be noted that the QVS algorithm is working on a block of data. To achieve
optimum performance one has to converge at an optimum block size. Small block sizes correspond to
faster operation and lower error rates while large block sizes correspond to rapid information transfer
capability and higher bandwidth requirement. We conducted experiments tacking block sizes of 200,
512, 1020, 15000 (there is no underlying principle that dictated the block size). From the observations
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made it was clear that higher block sizes meant longer encryption time. Speed can be improved by using
parallel any stand parallel processing techniques.

Figure 11: QVS block diagram.

7.3 The Pre-processor
This subsystem (Figure 10) consists of a sample and hold circuit, a decimator of a factor r and a pretransforming function Qin(d), where d represents the raw data. After the speech signal is sampled, it is
passed through a decimator. This step is essential to reduce the redundancy that is inherent in speech
data. The third step is perhaps the most important one. The transform Qin(d) takes the sample values of
the speech signal and converts them to integer values without sacrificing the voice clarity.
It must be noted that for telephone quality speech we need to be concerned with frequencies
between 300 Hz to 3.6 kHz. Thus we also need a band pass filter to pass only the frequency of interest.
However we assume that Sa(t) is an NB analog-signal.

36

Figure 12: Block diagram of the Pre-processor

The output of the pre-processor are integer symbols representing the discrete samples Sdes(n).There is yet
another restriction on the largest symbol that is used by the pre-processor to represent an input sample. If
the incoming sample is 857 then we need a quasi group of the size 857 to effectively encode the symbol.
Creating a quasi group of that size could take considerable time and resources. By keeping the symbol
range to a controllably small value, one can prevent heavy costs and maximize the speed and efficiency
of the encoder.
To make the encoder more efficient we can convert the output of the pre processor in to lower
range of symbols. We can do this by first getting the binary equivalent or a certain symbol and then
splitting the code-word in to two halves. Later this code-word is converted in to two symbols this way if
the output symbol is 8 bits code word is converted to two 4 bit code words(there by reducing the
dynamic range from 0-256 to 0-16). And it is not computationally intensive to generate a 16 by16 quasi
group. We can also split 8 bit code word to four two bit code words and further reduce the dynamic
range but one must note that while this splitting reduces the size of the quasi group that has to be
generated it also increases the number of encryptions/decryptions that have to be performed.
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We need to make a choice between the size of the quasi group generated and the number of
encryption/decryptions cycles to ensure quality, speed and complexity. If a

7.4 Experimental Results: Pre-processor
In Figure 11 the first graph (a) is the output of the pre-processor. We can see that it is periodic from its
auto-correlation properties. However after scrambling the output becomes highly randomized (the autocorrelation of the encoded data is same as that of a random sequence). Hearing tests show that the
encoded sequence sounds similar to the sequence generated by the ‘rand’ function (in Matlab). The
decoded sequence on the other hand sounds exactly the same as that of the original signal.

Figure 13: Speech input and autocorrelation of input and output
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7.5 The Post-processor
The post processor does exactly the reverse operation of the pre-processor. The input to the postprocessor is the decoded symbol vector Ssym(n) from the MIQE. This sequence of symbols is
transformed to the original form by the inverse transform Q-1(e) (where e is the decoded symbol vector).
The discrete set of samples are interpolated (the discrete set of samples is represented as d in Figure 12)
to obtain the analog signal that was initially transmitted. (This step is only meant to improve the speech
clarity). If the pre-processor decimates the original samples by a factor r then the post-processor
interpolates the sequence by the same factor r. This is done to counter the loss of speech information
caused by the decimator. It would be difficult to interpret the decoded data without the knowledge of the
inverse transform.

Figure 14: Block diagram of a Post-processor
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7.6 Experimental Results: Post-processor

Figure 15: Graphs of the encoded data, decoded: Post-processor output and autocorrelation of decoded

data

It may be observed that the encoded sequence is highly randomized. However the decoded sequence is
similar to the transmitted sequence. The autocorrelation property of the decoded sequence (Figure 13 c)
is slightly different than the autocorrelation of the input data; this is because of the mismatch in the
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interpolation factor r1 and the decimation factor r2. It must be noted that the autocorrelation graphs
cannot be identical because of the inherent loss of information in the transmitted data. Listening tests
have revealed that the output of the encoder sounds similar to noise. This happens even when no
information is sent. Thus the is no way of telling when the transmission has stared/ended. Since this
transform is time dependent it becomes all the more difficult to distinguish between the two.

7.7 Application of QVS In Cellular Networks

Figure 16: a possible application of QVS to the cellular network

Generally, a cellular network consists of hexagonal coverage regions called cells. Each of the
coverage regions has a central antenna called cell site. The cell site is responsible for handling all the
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users in a specific coverage area that is under its coverage. Apart from this it has several
responsibilities. Let us first list the duties of the cell site:
1. It has to connect two users when demanded
2. It has to keep track of all the users in its coverage area.
3. It has to allow new users that have entered its coverage area from its adjacent cell.
4. It has to notify the appropriate cell when a user is leaving its coverage area and entering the new
coverage area.
In the normal operation when the user A wants to talk to B then he requests the cell site to establish a
connection to B. So the cell site has to determine the location of B; in this case B is located in the same
cell site as A. Thus the cell site can directly allocate the channel between A and B. Now let us consider
the second case where A wants to communicate with C. The cell site refers to the Global position
register and finds that the user c is in the adjacent cell. It contacts the corresponding cell site and informs
it that the user A wants to communicate with user B. The two cell sites acknowledge and open a
communication channel between A and B. It must be noted that in both cases that the connection is
made through the cell site. We now have to discuss the role the QVS in this scheme. After the
connection is made, if the user A wants to send a secret code to B he has to request the cell site for a
secured encrypted connection. Then the cell site authenticates the two parties and enables the encryption
module that is embedded on all the devices on the network. The cell site also has to supply the two
parties with the index numbers and orders that are used for encryption. This way the index numbers and
orders are unique to a particular user pair. Shortage of keys will not be experienced since FG 1 can
generate many index vectors depending on the order used and number of isotope allowed. We have
already shown that the change in the order of index numbers also affects the output of the encoder. This
property also increases the number of possible keys that can be generated. FG1 is only present in the cell
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sites where as MEG 1 is present in both cell site and the end user device. FG1 can be called a secret
hardware [18] since the actual process of generating the keys is kept from the users.
The load on FG1 is of some concern. It should be noted that the FG1 comes to action only if two
calling parties demand a secured connection. When this happens the FG1 algorithm first sends an
activation signal to the two parties to activate the MEG1 module. Then the two parties agree upon a
certain criteria. Based upon the agreed upon criteria the FG1 algorithm generates the group orders and
number of isotopes and indices. This information is transmitted to the two parties. Ones this is done the
parties can start exchanging information.
Since the cell site has to now distribute criteria and encryption keys, certain amount of overhead
is inevitable. The load on FG1 depends on the number of user pairs demanding secure communication.
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Chapter 8: Security Analysis

8.1 Security of MLQE
A loop is a quasi group with an identity element e:

x*e=x=e*x

(14)

If one could find a loop in a quasi group transformation that would facilitate the task of breaking it. But
determining this is not easy and this task will equal the number of transformations associated with the
quasi group. Since a quasi group is defined by its multiplication table which is a Latin square, its
security would depend on the number of such Latin squares. The eavesdropper will have to guess the
specific Latin square used out of the total number that is possible.
A Latin square of order n is an n × n array in which n2 symbols, taken from a set A, are arranged
so that each symbol occurs only once in each row and exactly once in each column. A Latin square is
said to be normalized or reduced if the elements of both its first row and its first column are in a natural
order. For n ≥ 2, the total number LS(n) of Latin squares of order n is given by

LS(n) = n! (n − 1)! T(n)

(15)

Where T(n) denotes the number of reduced Latin squares of order n. The numbers T(n) and LS(n)
increase very quickly with n. Tables 3-5 give the number of reduced Latin squares (see [8] for details),
where for large n, the number of Latin squares is estimated using the double bound:
(16)
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Table 3. Reduced Latin squares for 2 ≤ n ≤ 10
N

T(n)

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1
1
4
56
9,048
16,942,808
535,281,401,585
377,597,570,964,258,816
7,580,721,160,132,811,489,280

Table 4. Reduced Latin squares for n == 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
N
11
12
13
14
15

T(n)
5.35 . 1033
1.62 . 1044
2.51 . 1056
2.33 . 1070
1.50 . 1086

Table 5. Bounds on the number of Latin squares for n = 16, 32, 64, 128, 256

N

Lower Limit (number of Latin
squares)

Upper Limit (number of Latin
squares)

16

.101*10119

.689*10138

32

.414*10726

.985*10784

64

.133*104008

.176*104169

128

.337*1020666

.164*1021091

256

.304*10101724

.753*10102805

It is clear from these tables that the task of breaking the quasi group cipher is of astronomical
complexity. Thus if the key is temporary, it would be very difficult to extract the information using brute
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force. The known plain text attack and replay attack are also not possible because the key keeps
changing.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and Future Work

We have shown that quasi group scrambling constitutes an excellent method of encryption and
generation of pseudo-random sequences. Quasi groups (or Latin squares) provide a powerful method for
generating a large set of permutation transformations by permuting not only the samples but also
transforming the amplitudes themselves across their range. We have also implemented a Quasi Voice
Scrambler which is capable of converting a voice signal to a random noise.
The proposed MIQE algorithm could use several group orders (in our examples we use two) and
in our example we use six indices. If we assume that these indices are in the range of 1 to 8 (as in the
example) and the maximum group order ‘n’ is 25, the order requires 32 bit and the indices require 3 bit
each, which sums to 18 (if we consider 6 indices) bits. So the key length excluding nonce and time
stamp is 32+18 = 50 bits. If the eavesdropper has to use brute force he simply has to try all 250
combinations. However the key size does not include the nonce and time stamp. Moreover since the key
constitutes of individual fields it is more difficult to guess the numbers in these fields. Even if one
guesses the indices he still has to figure out the hidden key which makes the number of possibilities to
250 * 218 which is quite large and since it is continuous the beginning is also unknown. Thus the
proposed example system can compete with DES since the complexity involved in breaking DES is
simply 264 possibilities for a key size of 64 bit. The RSA on the other hand provides greater security than
this for the typical values that are currently used. However, we can always use appropriate length keys
and index numbers and the value of nonce to obtain security that exceeds that of DES as well as RSA or
the more recently introduced ECC cryptosystems.
As further research we propose finding efficient ways to send the indices such that the eavesdropper
finds it difficult to extract the actual numbers. This however is not a critical problem for the system as
the key is updated randomly based on the time stamp.
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